Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Leo A. Walker v. Brigham City, Peter C. Knudsen,
Beth W. Currister, David G. Hacking, Dee J.
Hammon, Robert B. Shelton : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert R. Wallace; Hanson, Epperson & Smith P.C. Attorneys for appellant.
Jody K. Burnett; Williams & Hunt. Ben Hadfield; Jeff Thorne; Mann, Hadfield & Thorne. Attorneys
for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Walker v. Brigham City, No. 910240.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3547

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEO A. WALKER,
•-•

Plaintiff/Appellam

«.) 10240

vs.
BRIGHAM CITY, PETER C.
KNUDSON, BETH W. CURRISTEI
DAVID G. HACKING, DEE J.
HAMMON, ROBERT B. SHELTON,
Defendants/Respondents,
£F!IEF 0' FLATNTIFF/ftPPELLANT
Robert R, Wallace #3366
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
? Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Jody K, siici;v .,

WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 Soutn, suite _tt
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Jeff Thorne
Ben Hadfield
MANN, HADFIELD & TiiUiiT^
P . O. Box F

Brigham City, Utah

84301

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENT^'

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

CASES

iii

STATUTES

iv

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

V

COLLATERAL SOURCES

v

JURISDICTION

v

ISSUES PRESENTED

v

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. . . . .

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

vii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

vii

FACTS

viii

ARGUMENT
POINT I

POINT II

1
BECAUSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
GRANTED BELOW, THIS COURT WILL
AFFIRM ONLY WHEN NO GENUINE
ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AND THE
MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
FACTS WILL BE REVIEWED IN A
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
CITIZEN

1

BY STATUTE A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
MAY NOT CHARGE MORE THAN IS
REASONABLE AND NECESSARY TO RECOVER
CERTAIN COSTS OF PROVIDING ELECTRIC
UTILITY SERVICES. EXCESS CHARGES
ARE PROSCRIBED

2

i

POINT III

POINT IV

POINT V

POINT VI

BY CASE LAW, CHARGES FOR UTILITY
SERVICES ARE FEES NOT TAXES AND
MUST NOT BE IN EXCESS OF A
REASONABLE RATE FOR THE SERVICE
RENDERED. TO THE EXTENT THEY
USED TO RAISE REVENUE, THEY ARE
ILLEGAL
TAKING OF PROPERTY BY CHARGING
EXCESS FEES NOT REASONABLY RELATED
TO THE SERVICES PROVIDED IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING IN VIOLATION
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS

13

RAISING REVENUES THROUGH UTILITY
FEES IS ILLEGAL AND ALTERS THE
STATUTORY BURDENS OF TAXES

16

EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF
THE CITIZEN

18

POINT VII TRIAL WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IF
CITIZEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED
CONCLUSION

19
21

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Aloha Sanitary Dist. v. Wilkins, 245 Or. 40,
420 P.2d 74, 77 (1966)

5

Banberry Development Corporation v. South Jordan City,
631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981)

9,20,21

Bauer v. City of Chicago, 321 111. 259, 151 N.E.2d 902

11

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State,
779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989)

1

Cache Co. v. Jensen. 21 Utah 207, 61 P.303 (1900) . . . . . . . 7
Call v. The City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257
(Utah 1980)
Chesapeake v. Potomac Telephone Company v. City of
Moraantown. 143 W.VA. 800, 105 S.E.2d 260 (1958)
City of Chicago Heights v. Public Service
Commission of Northern Illinois, 97 N.E.2d 807
(111. 1951)
City of Chicago Heights v. Western Union
Telegraph Company. 406 111. 428, 94 N.E.2d 306

10,13
6
6,10,11,14

City of Stanfield v. Burnett, 222 Or. 427,
353 P.2d 242 (1960)

11,14
5

Conoco, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
520 So.2d 404 (La. 1988)

14

Consolidation Coal Co. v. Emery County, 702 P.2d 121
(Utah 1985)

6,7

Home Builders Association of Greater Kansas City v.
City of Kansas City. 555 S.W.2d 832, 835
(Missouri 1977)

13

Home Builders Association v. Provo City. 28 Utah 2d 402,
503 P.2d 451 (1972)

5,8,9

Jennings v. Walsh. 214 Kan. 398, 521 P.2d 311 (1974)
Lafferty v. Pavson City. 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982)
iii

5
7,8,20

Little America Hotel v. Salt Lake City. 785 P.2d 1106,
1107, (Utah 1989)
Mountain States Telephone v. Salt Lake County,
702 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985)

1
5,10,11

Murray City v. Board of Education, 16 Utah.2d 115,
396 P.2d 628 (1964)

5

Nature's Rival Company v. City of Chicago, 324 111.
566, 155 N.E.2d 356

11

Park Towne v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,
et al. . 433 A.2d 610 (Pa. 1981)

11

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Pennsylvania
Gas & Water Company

12

Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. Salt Lake City
Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987) . . . .

4,5

Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. The Great N.
Baseball Co. , 786, P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987)

1

Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah.2d 560, 63 P.2d 259 (1953). . .10
State of North Carolina, ex rel Utilities Commission v.
Edmisten, 263 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. 1980)
Utilities Commission v. Duke Power Company, 285 N.C.
377, 206 S.E.2d 269 (1974)
Ward Baking Company v. City of Chicago, 348 111. 212,
172 N.E.2d 171
Weber Basin Home Builders Association v. Roy, 26 Utah
2d 215, 217, 487 P.2d 466, 467 (1971)
Williams v. Hawkins, 372 S.2d 1010 (Fla. 1979)

15
15
11
7,8,13
12

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 17-5-27

7

Utah Code Annotated § 55-3-1 et seq.

2

Utah Code Annotated § 55-3-10

vi,ix,2,3,18
iv

Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (i)

v

Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)

v

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 22

vi,16

COLLATERAL SOURCES
11 E.McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 31.30a
(3d Rev.Ed. 1983)

5

12 E.McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
Para. 34.82 at 200

6

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(i), unless the definition of "local agency" under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) is broad enough to include a city itself as
opposed to its agencies.

ISSUES PRESENTED
In short, may a city use fees for city-owned electric
services as revenue raising tax substitutes?
In more detail, may a city which owns and operates an
electric utility system, under Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-1 et seq.,
set rates for utility service such that large surpluses are
anticipated and generated which are regularly transferred to the
general fund and used for general city obligations, and which
result in one-third of all general revenues of the city?
v

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 22 states:
Private property shall not be taken
. . . for public use without just
compensation.
Utah Code An. § 55-3-10 states:
Rates for services furnished by any project
or service as described in Section 55-3-1
hereof shall be reasonable and uniform in
respect to class at all times. They may be
fixed precedent to the issuance of the bonds.
Such rates shall be sufficient to provide for
the payment of the interest upon and
principal of all such bonds as and when the
same become due and payable, to create a bond
and interest sinking fund therefor, to
provide for the payment of the expenses of
administration and operation and such
expenses for the maintenance of the project
or service, necessary to preserve the same in
good repair and working order, to build up a
reserve for depreciation, to build up a
reserve for improvements, betterments and
extensions other than those necessary to
maintain the same in good repair and working
order, and to pay the interest on and
principal of any other bonds or obligations
outstanding and issued in connection with the
purchase, construction, repair or improvement
of the project or service. Such rates may be
fixed and revised from time to time so as to
produce these amounts and the governing body
may covenant and agree in the ordinance or
other legislative enactment authorizing the
issuance of such bonds and on the face of
each bond at all times to maintain such rates
for services furnished by the project or
service as shall be sufficient to provide for
the foregoing, but not in excess of a
reasonable rate for the service rendered.
(Emphasis added.)

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A citizen of Brigham City challenges overcharges for
city-owned electric power which result in large, anticipated and
realized surpluses which are regularly transferred to the city's
general fund and used for general obligations of the city.
When it became undisputed that approximately $1,500,000
yearly in electric utility surplus revenues were being
transferred into the city's general fund, the citizen/plaintiff
moved for partial summary judgment.

It was "partial" because it

related only to the surplus electric utility charges, and his
complaint was broader.

The lower court denied the motion.

The city then filed a motion for partial summary
judgment which was granted.
The citizen/plaintiff appeals 1) the denial of his
motion for partial summary judgment, and 2) the granting of the
city/defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.

See Facts,

below.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For years, Brigham City has regularly budgeted that the
rates it charges the Appellant and others for its city-owned
electric power will produce huge surpluses.

Such surpluses,

approximately $1.5 million per year, are generated, transferred
to the general fund, and used for general city obligations.

vii

Electric utility charges are fees for a service.
Taxes, not fees, may be used to generate revenues.

Regularly

anticipating and realizing large revenues from the charging of
utility fees is illegal under statute and case law, and
constitutes an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.
Use of utility fees to raise revenues alters the
legislatively created scheme for spreading tax burdens.
The granting of the City's motion for summary judgment
was therefore improper and appellant's motion for summary
judgment should have been granted.

FACTS
1.

Defendant/Respondent, Brigham City Corporation

(hereafter "the City") is a municipal corporation,

the remaining

defendants were members of the city council and/or agents of the
City in charge of collecting for electrical usage.
2.

The City owns and operates the only electric

utility within the city which provides power to
Plaintiff/Appellant. R. at 286; 290, para. 2; 330, para. 7; 63839; 641, para. 1; 654, para 7.
3.

Plaintiff/Appellant (hereafter the "Citizen") is a

resident of the City and a retired plumbing contractor living on
limited means, owns real estate within the City, and subscribes
to an pays for public utility service provided by the City owned

viii

electric utility.

R. at 057, para. 1; 178, para. 1; 290, para.

2; 405, para. 1.
4.

Monies paid to the City for electrical power are

held in a consolidated utility fund with separate accounting for
electric utility revenues.

R. at 290, para. 5; 329, para. 5;

641, para. 6; 653, para. 5.
5.

The rates which the City charged and charges the

Citizen and all other citizens of the City for electric power,
were set by the City to yield, consistently, large surpluses over
and above the costs of providing the utility service.
paragraphs 16, 22; 181, paragraphs 16, 22; 286.

R. at 059,

See also,

paragraphs 10 to 11, below.
6.

The costs necessary to provide the service consist

of the following, as set by statute: 1) the payment of interest
and principal of all bonds, 2) a bond and interest sinking fund,
3) payment of the expenses of administration and operation and
maintenance of the project or service, 4) creating a reserve for
depreciation, and 5) creating a reserve for improvements,
betterments and extensions other than those necessary to maintain
the system.

Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10.

Thus the surpluses anticipated and received by the City
were expected by the City to exceed, and exceeded all costs to
provide the utility service.
7.

The surpluses were transferred to the City's

general fund, commingled with tax revenues received by the City
ix

and used for general obligations of the City.

R. at 061, para.

23; 181, para. 17; 182, para. 23; 286; 290, para. 6; 641, para.
7; 653, para 1.
8.

The City regularly set rates for power usage high

enough to yield large surpluses; budgets approved by the City
specifically contemplated the generation of the following
electric utility surpluses in the following fiscal years:
1986-87

$1,275,859

1988-89

$1,275,858

R. at 215, para. 45; 242, para. 45; 278, para. 2; R. at 251
(Facts not disputed by the City).

Budgets for other years

included similar anticipated surpluses, but the amounts are in
dispute.

R. at 228-246.
9.

The City budgets contemplated that the anticipated

electric utility surpluses would be transferred from the
consolidated utility fund to the city's general fund and used for
general city obligations.

Ld. and R. at 060, para. 17 & 18; 178,

para. 1; 181, para. 18.
10.
the City.

Anticipated surpluses were actually realized by

The City recovered the following surpluses in the

following years:
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88

$1,184,996
1,193,931
1,494,993
1,770,678
approx. 1,275,000
1,275,858
x

R. at 212, para. 26; 236, para 26; 238, para. 31; 239, para. 36;
241, para. 41; 242, para. 45; 244, para. 53.
11.

All anticipated or actual electric utility

expenses for each fiscal year were:
Budgeted
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88

Actual
1,194,796
2,026,170

2,286,893
2,706,559

1988-89
R. at 214, para. 39; 215, para. 44; 238, para. 31; 239, para. 36;
240, para. 39; 242, para. 44; 243, para. 48. Budgeted and actual
expenses for other years where no figure is listed were similar,
but the exact amount in dispute.
12.

R. at 228-246.

A simple comparison of paragraphs 10 and 11,

above, indicates that the charges to rate-payers which resulted
in the revenues to pay the electric utility expenses and to
provide the surpluses in paragraph 10, were almost double that
necessary to provide the services alone.

In fiscal year 1983-84,

the costs of providing the electrical services was almost the
same as the surplus transferred to the general fund, therefore
the charges to rate payers was almost double that which was
necessary.
13.

The fact that the surpluses, their anticipation

and their use, were not in dispute is also illustrated by the
xi

statement of the City's counsel at oral argument February 25,
1991:
The charges for utility services have
historically, in Brigham City, generated a
surplus, . . . That surplus is transferred
pursuant to the City's budget process to the
general fund and is used for general
municipal activities.
Transcript of hearing at 2,

1

The transcription of the hearing was designated as part of
the record but was not numbered by the district court clerk.
xii

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED BELOW,
THIS COURT WILL AFFIRM ONLY WHEN NO GENUINE
ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AND THE MOVING PARTY IS
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
FACTS WILL BE REVIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE CITIZEN.
It is well settled law that the standard for review is
as stated in the point heading above:
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In considering
an appeal from a grant of summary judgment,
we review the facts in a light most favorable
to the losing party below.
Little America Hotel v. Salt Lake City, 785 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Utah
1989), quoting Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779
P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
accorded no deference.

The trial court's conclusions are

Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. The

Great N. Baseball Co., 786, P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987).

Citations

to the quotation and Blue Cross and Blue Shield are omitted.
The lower court not only granted the City's motion for
summary judgment, but denied summary judgment to the Citizen.
Because the Citizen lost its motion for summary judgment, facts
relating to that motion for summary judgment should also be
considered in a light most favorable to the Citizen.

1

POINT II
BY STATUTE A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION MAY NOT
CHARGE MORE THAN IS REASONABLE AND NECESSARY
TO RECOVER CERTAIN COSTS OF PROVIDING
ELECTRIC UTILITY SERVICES. EXCESS CHARGES
ARE PROSCRIBED.
Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-1, et seq. provides for public
works programs.

Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-1 authorizes any city to

construct electric and other power plants and distribution
systems.
Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10 limits the fees which may be
charged by such a public works program to those sufficient to
provide for producing the power and operating the system in
question, and not in excess thereof.

See § 55-3-10, above at vi.

Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10 states that: "Rates for
services furnished by any project or service as described in
Section 55-3-1 hereof shall be reasonable . . . "

The statute

continues by stating that such rates: "shall be sufficient to
provide for" specified costs of doing business, including
reserves: 1) paying interest and principal of all bonds, 2)
creating a bond and interest sinking fund, 3) paying the expenses
of administration and operation and maintenance of the project or
service, 4) creating a reserve for depreciation, and 5) creating
a reserve for improvements, betterments and extensions other than
those necessary to maintain the system.
10.

Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-

The above contemplate all costs necessary to operate the

system.
2

The statute is clear that the rates which may be fixed
may produce sufficient revenues to provide for those areas
mentioned above, but not amounts in excess thereof:
Such rates may be fixed and revised • . . so
as to produce these amounts, and . . .
maintain such rates for services furnished by
the project or service as shall be sufficient
to provide for the foregoing. but not in
excess of a reasonable rate for the service
rendered.
(Emphasis added.)
Under the present circumstances, the City does not set
the rates sufficient to provide only for costs of operation
mentioned above and not in excess of a reasonable rate for the
service rendered.

The City sets rates for the specific,

contemplated purpose of creating surpluses which the City
specifically declares will be transferred to the general fund.
The rates are set to produce revenue, not just provide a service.
The City then diverts that revenue into the general fund as
contemplated in the budget.

Such a practice is unlawful and

should not be countenanced.
The court below denied plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on the facts and law just recounted.

The Citizen

submits that the lower court should have granted the Citizen's
motion for summary judgment on the undisputed facts and should
have held that the excess charges, anticipated by the City in its
budget, collected and diverted to the general fund, were
improper.

Instead of doing this, the court held to the contrary,
3

finding that no factual circumstance could be proved whereby the
excess charges could be violative of the above-mentioned statute.
That decision was error.

POINT III
BY CASE LAW, CHARGES FOR UTILITY SERVICES ARE
FEES NOT TAXES AND MOST NOT BE IN EXCESS OF A
REASONABLE RATE FOR THE SERVICE RENDERED. TO
THE EXTENT THEY ARE USED TO RAISE REVENUE
THEY ARE ILLEGAL.
Courts in Utah have long made a distinction between
fees and taxes. A fee is a charge imposed for a service
rendered, and may not exceed the reasonable cost of rendering
that service.

If the fee is greater than the reasonable cost of

rendering the service, resulting in revenue, it is considered a
tax, and is inappropriate, beyond statutory authority, and even
unconstitutional.
In Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. Salt Lake City
Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987), this Court had
before it the issue of "whether the payment of sewer service
charges is the payment of a tax."

jEd. at 636.

If the sewer

service charges were a tax, then certain limitations on filing
suits would apply.
This Court specifically held that sewer charges are
fees not taxes:
"Sewer charges and fees are not taxes or
special assessments, but are in the nature of
tolls or rents paid for services furnished or
4

available." 11 E.McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations § 31.30a (3d Rev.Ed. 1983). See
also, Jennings v. Walsh, 214 Kan. 398, 521
P.2d 311 (1974).
Id. at 637. The court continued:
In Home Builders Association of Greater Salt
Lake v. Provo City, 28 Utah.2d 402, 503 P.2d
451 (1972), and Murray City v. Board of
Education, 16 Utah.2d 115, 396 P.2d 628
(1964), this Court denied the
characterization of a sewer charge and a
connection charge as a revenue measure and
stated that such charges are neither taxes
nor assessments but payments for services
furnished. Home Builders Association, 503
P.2d at 452. That characterization is echoed
in City of Stanfield v. Burnett, 222 Or. 427,
353 P.2d 242 (1960), overruled on other
grounds, Aloha Sanitary Dist. v. Wilkins, 245
Or. 40, 420 P.2d 74, 77 (1966), where
property owners not hooked up to the sewer
system had challenged the city's imposition
of a fee and where the court found that "a
charge for the use of a sewer is not a tax or
assessment, but a charge for a service
rendered and is based on contract."
Id. at 637 (Emphasis added).

The court finally concluded that

the sewer charges were not a levy to raise revenues, therefore
not a tax: "The fee therefore was a use charge and not a levy to
raise revenues."

Jd. at 638.

In Mountain States Telephone v. Salt Lake County, 702
P.2d 113 (Utah 1985), this Court considered a county ordinance
levying a utility tax on the sale of utility services in
unincorporated areas of the county.

The court found that local

revenue measures are ultra vires where they are supported by
nothing more than the power to regulate.
5

The court then quoted

with approval, an Illinois case, City of Chicago Heights v.
Public Service Company. infra, wherein the Illinois court:
"struck down an ordinance which imposed
license fees greatly in excess of the
reasonable cost of regulating the use of the
City streets. See also 12 E McQuillin,
supra, Paragraph 34.82 at 200 ("the fee is
invalid if its amount is so much in excess of
that necessary for supervision and inspection
that it is clear the fee is one for
revenue").
Id. at 118 (Emphasis added).

The court cited other cases from

other jurisdictions with approval, such as Chesapeake v. Potomac
Telephone Company v. City of Morgantown, 143 W.VA. 800, 105
S.E.2d 260 (1958).
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Emery County, 702 P.2d 121
(Utah 1985), several businesses sought declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, and a refund of fees paid, challenging the
validity of portions of an Emery County business license
ordinance.

The district court declared the challenged portions

unconstitutional and beyond Emery County's statutory authority,
and enjoined any further efforts to enforce the provisions.

The

portions of the statute challenged required payment to the county
of an additional business license fee of one-half of one percent
of the fair market value of goods sold, where such value exceeded
$150,000 per year.

In finding the fee inappropriate, the court

specifically found that the money to be generated thereby (over
$800,000), as the money in the case at bar, "was to go into Emery
County's general fund to be expended for general county
6

purposes."

Id. at 123. The lower court also found that the fee

bore no relationship to the cost of enforcing the ordinance, and
the monies generated appeared to be general revenue.
This Court affirmed the district court, and discussed
the distinction between a licensing fee, which must reasonably
relate to the costs of the service, and a fee primarily to raise
revenue under a municipality's taxing power:
Fees for services which were not under the
taxing powers "must bear some reasonable
relationship to the cost of regulating the
business so licensed." Weber Basin Home
Builders Association v. Roy, 26 Utah 2d 215,
217, 487 P.2d 466, 467 (1971).
Id. at 123. The court considered Utah Code Annotated § 17-5-27
which authorizes the county commission to "license for a purpose
of regulation and revenue all and every kind of business not
prohibited by law."

Id. at 123 (Emphasis added).

In spite of

that statute which apparently authorized a county to charge a fee
to obtain revenue as well as to recoup costs of service, this
Court affirmed its prior holding in Cache Co. v. Jensen, 21 Utah
207, 61 P.303 (1900), and declared that the county could not
charge a fee to "raise revenue through licensing except insofar
as such revenue is necessary to, and therefore proportionate to,
the cost of regulation of the licensed entities." Consolidated
Coal at 127.
In Laffertv v. Pavson Citv. 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982),
this Court considered an "impact fee" of $1,000.00 per family
7

dwelling unit prior to issuance of any building permit.
district court held that such a fee was not proper.

The

This Court

affirmed the district court's reliance on Weber Basin Home
Builder's Association v. Roy City, 26 Utah.2d 215, 487 P.2d 866
(1971), where the lower court invalidated "an increase in a
building permit fee on the basis that it was an illegal tax."
Id. at 378. The district court invalidated the fee because it
was in the nature of a tax to raise revenue:
The opinion notes that the purpose of the
increase was to obtain additional money for
the city's general fund, into which the
proceeds were deposited.
Id. at 378 (Emphasis added).
court.

This Court affirmed the district

This Court cited several cases where "fees were imposed

to finance a specific municipal service or capital expenditure"
which the court felt was proper.

However, the fee in question

and that in the Weber Basin Home Builders case was
distinguishable, "on the basis that a reasonable charge for a
specific service is permissible whereas a general fee that
amounts to a revenue measure is not.

Home Builders Association

of Greater Salt Lake, 28 Utah.2d at 404, 503 P.2d at 452." Id.
at 378 (Emphasis added).

The court then affirmed, stating that

impact fees deposited in the city's general fund were an illegal
tax:
We affirm that distinction and agree with the
district court's conclusion that the impact
fee deposited in the city's general revenues
8

in this case is an illegal tax. Weber Basin
Home Builders Association v. Roy City, supra.
Id. at 378.
In Banberrv Development Corporation v. South Jordan
City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981) (Hereafter "BanberrvM, this Court
upheld the validity of water connection and park improvement fees
assessed against developers of real property.

The court cited

Home Builders Association v. Provo City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d
451 (1972), discussed below at Point IV, wherein this Court
sustained the validity of a sewer connection fee which was
imposed in order to improve and enlarge the sewer system.

The

court found that the improvement fee was not a revenue measure or
an assessment, but a "reasonable charge for the use thereof,"
Banberry at 903, because the funds generated were to be used in
reasonable relation to the service provided:
. . . the funds obtained were to be
restricted to the enlargement, improvement,
and operation of the sewer system and to the
retirement of indebtedness incurred in its
construction.
Id. at 309.
This Court also quoted a New Jersey case.

The Court

held that a connection fee could be more than the direct cost
incident to hooking up the sewer, if the additional fees were
only an equitable means of sharing earlier costs for such a
facility:
Therefore, where the fee charged a new
subdivision on a new property hook up exceeds
9

the direct cost incident thereto (as a means
of sharing the costs of common facilities),
the excess must survive measure against the
standard that the total costs "faLI equitably
upon those who are similarly situated and in
a just proportion to benefits conferred."
Id. at 903.
In Call v. The City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah
1980), developers attacked an ordinance requiring subdividers to
dedicate seven percent of proposed subdivision land or pay
equivalent of that value in cash.

This Court upheld the required

dedication of land, but only if the evidence reasonably
established that the municipality will be required to provide
more land for parks and playgrounds as a result of the
subdivision.

Again, the fee for the service must reasonably

relate to the service.
See Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah.2d 560, 63 P.2d 259
(1953), wherein the court stated that fees may be charged for
services rendered in probate proceedings, but they must bear some
reasonable relation to the extent and nature of the services
rendered, otherwise such fees are in contemplation of the law
taxes.

Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord.
In City of Chicago Heights v. Public Service Commission

of Northern Illinois, 97 N.E.2d 807 (111. 1951), cited favorably
by this Court in Mountain States Telephone v. Salt Lake County.
above, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered a city's attempt
to enforce an ordinance requiring the public utility to pay $5.00
10

for every pole, and $.025 for each wire crossing each street, and
other charges.

The court held that:

The license fees charged must bear some
reasonable relation to the additional burdens
and necessary expense involved in the
regulation and supervision of the business
affected, otherwise the ordinance imposing
the license fees will be regarded as a
revenue measure and being unauthorized deemed
null and void. Ward Baking Company v. City
of Chicago, 348 111. 212, 172 N.E.2d 171;
Nature's Rival Company v. City of Chicago.
324 111. 566, 155 N.E.2d 356; Bauer v. City
of Chicago, 321 111. 259, 151 N.E.2d 902.
Id. at 810 (Emphasis added).

The court recognized that fees may

be unreasonable as a matter of law:
A license fee may, however, be so grossly
excessive as to be deemed arbitrary and
unreasonable as a matter of law. City of
Chicago Heights v. Western Union Telegraph
Company, 406 111. 428, 94 N.E.2d 306; (other
citations omitted) in the first Chicago
Heights case, we specifically held that the
fees imposed . . . were so grossly excessive
as to be unreasonable as a matter of law.
Id. at 810. The court held that the fees in question were
excessive and unreasonable as a matter of law.
The City of Chicago Heights case was cited with
approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Mountain States Telephone
v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985).

See discussion of

that case, above.
In Park Towne v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, et al.. 433 A.2d 610 (Pa. 1981), the issue before the
court was whether or not rate payers should be charged for
11

imprudent management of the utility company.

The Public Utility

Commission of Pennsylvania held that the utility customers were
not so responsible, and the Pennsylvania court agreed:
We agree with the Commission that PECO's
(Philadelphia Electric Companies) customers
are not required to reimburse the utility,
through rate changes, for expenditures
imprudently made as the Supreme Court wrote
in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v.
Pennsylvania Gas & Water Company (citation
omitted): "The original cost of the property
is not to be taken as controlling (in the
ascertainment of the fair value of a
utilities property for rate making purposes),
for there may have been extravagance in
purchasing, or bad management . . . "
In Williams v. Hawkins, 372 S.2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).

The

court of appeals cited the Florida Supreme Court for the
proposition that "if a license fee was unconnected with the cost
of regulating the utilities which would pay the fee, then it is a
tax and illegal."

Id. at 1010.

The City in the present case is in the same position as
the public utilities mentioned above, and may not charge for more
than reasonable expenses to create general revenues.
In the present case there is no factual dispute
concerning the surpluses intended and generated by the City
through its excessive charges.

For the past several years the

City has created budgets which anticipated and expected the
reasonable costs of utility services to be far less than revenues
generated by the City's rates. The budgets expected that almost
1.5 million dollars per year in overcharges would be transferred
12

from utility accounts into the general fund to be used for
general obligations of the City.
Not only did the City expect and budget for the excess
utility charges which would be transferred to the general fund,
but transfers of almost 1.5 million dollars were made in each
year at issue, at least from 1982. The percent of over-charging
utility customers is gross and excessive, constituting almost
double the amount reasonable and necessary to provide the
service.

Such charges are unlawful, and should not be allowed.

POINT IV
TAKING OF PROPERTY BY CHARGING EXCESS FEES
NOT REASONABLY RELATED TO THE SERVICES
PROVIDED IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING IN
VIOLATION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
In Call v. The City of West Jordan, supra, this Court
cited a Missouri case favorably which held that fees reasonably
related to the services provided are permissible, but if they are
not so reasonably related, payment of such fees "amounts to a
confiscation of private property in contravention of the
constitutional prohibitions . . . "

Call at 1259 quoting Home

Builders Association of Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas
City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Missouri 1977).
In Weber Basin Home Builders Association v. Roy City,
supra, Roy raised its building permit fee from $12.00 to $112.00
and admitted that it had not experienced commensurate increases
13

in the cost of running its building department in issuing
permits.

The fee was simply additional revenue for the city.

In

that case, the court held that such excess charges were
unconstitutional.
Cases from other jurisdictions concur with this Court.
In City of Chicago Heights, supra. the Illinois court
affirmed a prior holding, City of Chicago Heights v. Western
Union Telegraph Company, 94 N.E.2d 306 (111. 1950).

In the

earlier, 1950, City of Chicago Heights case, the Illinois Supreme
Court found that fees required to be paid were unconstitutional
because they merely went into the public treasury without the
service being provided for which the fees were supposedly
charged, just as the fees in the case at bar:
A closer scrutiny of the ordinance under
attack discloses that there are no other
essential features there ordained, except the
collection and payment into the general
treasury of the City of the fees therein
provided for and consent to the erection and
maintenance of any poles and wires by the
City Council. No standards or specifications
are prescribed, no inspection or supervision
is required, no disposition is made of the
fees to be paid thereunder except that they
be paid to the City clerk and presumably into
the general fund of the City.
Id. at 308 (Emphasis added).
In Conoco, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
520 So.2d 404 (La. 1988), the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated
that the public service commission's power to fix rates was
limited by the Constitution.
14

In State of North Carolina, ex rel Utilities Commission
v, Edmisten, 263 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. 1980), the Supreme Court of
North Carolina recognized that rates for utilities should be
reasonable and must be consistent with state and federal
constitutional provisions:
Chapter 62 of the General Statutes confers
upon the Commission both the power and the
duty to compel the public utility to render
adequate service to its public customers in
return for reasonable rates (citation
omitted)• These rates are to be fixed by the
Commission as low as may be reasonably
consistent with due process requirements of
the State and Federal Constitutions.
Utilities Commission v. Duke Power Company,
285 N.C. 377, 206 S.E.2d 269 (1974).
Id. at 587.
Even the statutes involved recognized that courts
considering actions of the commission "may reverse or modify the
decision if the substantial rights of the appellants have been
prejudiced because the Commission's findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional
provisions, . . . Id. at 588, Note 3.
In the present case, the amount of overcharges are
clear.

Each year anticipated surpluses are taken from the

utility funds and placed in the general fund for general City
obligations.

That is established as a matter of law.

Clearly the utility charges are excessive and merely a
revenue device, a tax.

That tax constitutes an unconstitutional
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taking of property without just compensation and is unlawful.
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 22.

POINT V
RAISING REVENUES THROUGH UTILITY FEES IS
ILLEGAL AND ALTERS THE STATUTORY BURDENS OF
TAXES.
The Legislature of Utah has set up a specific plan for
taxation of citizens by the state and by municipalities.

That

system of taxation contemplates the spreading of the tax burden
in a certain manner.

Allowing a municipality to use service

charges as revenue raising taxation is contrary to the
legislative plan for spreading the tax burden, and is therefore
illegal.

One example, proffered to the court in the hearing of

February 25, 1991, at p. 222, illustrates how revenue raising
fees alter the tax burden under the present circumstances.
Volcraft is a large industry in Brigham city which owns real
property on which it operates.
the edge of, the City.

The property is within, but at

It does not receive power from the City-

owned electric utility system. As a property owner, Volcraft
would be assessed real property taxes which would become part of
the general revenues of the City.

If the City raised all monies

in its general fund through real property taxes and not utility

2

The transcription of the hearing was designated as part of
the record but was not numbered by the district court clerk.
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surpluses, Volcraft would pay a certain number of dollars in
taxes.
Because a significant portion of the general revenues
is raised through excessive utility service charges, the amount
of money needed to be raised by real property taxes is decreased
by the amount of surplus utility fees transferred to the general
fund.

Thus the amount of money which Volcraft pays in real

property taxes is decreased.

The utility users, such as the

Citizen, make up that decrease in real property tax through
payment of the excess utility charges.
Another example, proffered to the court at page 23 of
the transcript of the February 25, 1991 hearing, is renters who
pay their own utilities.

Such renters would pay no real property

taxes, but the real property taxes for the rich are kept low
because the renters pay excessive utility fees which go into the
general fund.
The situations concerning Volcraft and utility paying
renters illustrate the illegality in the City's actions in
altering the legislatively created method of spreading the tax
burden.

In fact, the Volcraft example illustrates why the

Citizen's motion for summary judgment should have been granted.
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POINT VI
EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF THE
CITIZEN.
The City admitted to those facts set out under "Facts,"
above, that the City had budgeted for the surpluses indicated
therein, and had regularly obtained anticipated surpluses, and
had transferred the amounts stated therein to the general fund.
The Citizen's expert, a certified public accountant,
economist, and, at the time, a senior manager in the accounting
firm of Ernst & Young, reviewed financial records of the City
which indicated the costs and expenses of providing electrical
service within Brigham City, which comport with Utah Code Ann.
S 55-3-10, quoted and discussed at length under Point II, above.
He stated:
6.

I have reviewed financial records
which indicate the expenses and
costs of providing electrical
service within Brigham City,
including but not limited to: the
payment of interest upon the
principal of bonds related to
electric utilities; bond and
interest sinking funds; payment of
expenses for administration,
operation and maintenance of the
utility service; and reserves for
depreciation.

7.

From my review I have formed the
conclusion that the amount of
monies charged to electric utility
users, for electric utility
services in Brigham City, exceed
the costs and expenses mentioned in
paragraph 6, above; and result in
18

excess funds which are transferred
by Brigham City to its general fund
and used for public purposes other
than for the provision of electric
or other utility service.
R. at 722. Of course, his opinion is really unnecessary.

The

City's admitted consistent creation of approximately 1.5 million
in surpluses year after year establishes that revenues exceed
costs.
Not only did the expert conclude that the monies
transferred to the general fund were used for general obligations
of the City and not for provision of utility services, he also
was of the opinion that the amounts paid by the Citizen were
excessive for the services provided:
8.

I have also concluded that the
utility payments made by Mr. Leo
Walker, are in excess of a pro rata
rate for the cost to Brigham City
of services rendered to Mr. Walker.

R. at 723.
POINT VII
TRIAL WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IF CITIZEN'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY
DENIED.
The court denied the Citizen's motion for summary
judgment even though there was no genuine issue of fact that
excess utility charges were anticipated and charged to the
Citizen and others similarly situated, and that the surpluses
were regularly put in the general fund and used for general
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obligations of the City.

There was no dispute that the rates

charged by the City for electrical utilities constituted a
revenue measure.

Summary judgment should have been granted in

favor of the Citizen.
Even if such summary judgment should not have been
granted, summary judgment was not proper for the City.

In

Laffertv v. Payson City, above, this Court recognized that trial
was appropriate where the reasonableness of the fees was at
issue:
The district court . . . put plaintiffs to
trial on the reasonableness of those fees.
That was the correct procedure. Banberry
Development Corp. v. South Jordan City,
supra: Home Builders Association of Greater
Salt Lake v. Provo City, supra.
Id. at 378.
After the trial in Lafferty, the district court and
this Court were able to see that the fees were reasonable because
they, "represent the cost of creating, maintaining and using the
aforesaid utilities."

Id. at 378. The court continued that the

municipality needed to disclose the basis for its calculations
that the fees were reasonable: "The municipality has the burden
of disclosing the basis of its calculations to whoever challenges
the reasonableness of the fees."

Id. at 379.

Because the

district court in Lafferty did not take into account all of the
potential factors which the district court should have considered
under a then recent Banberry case, the court remanded the case to
20

the district court for taking of additional evidence, if
necessary, consistent with Banberry and the factors stated
therein for determining whether or not the fees were reasonably
related to the services provided.
This case also should have gone to trial even if,
somehow, the undisputed fact of the excessiveness of the City's
fees and the use thereof as a revenue measure should not have
resulted in the grant of the Citizen's motion for summary
judgment.

CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that the City regularly, consistently
and intentionally overcharged the Citizen and others similarly
situated for utility services in order to create large, yearly
utility surpluses which were transferred regularly into the
general fund and used for general City obligations.

Such

overcharges were revenue raising, illegal taxes outside the
legislatively established method of taxing, and of allocating tax
burdens.
The summary judgment in favor of the City should be
reversed, the denial of the Citizen's summary judgment should
also be reversed, and the case remanded to the district court for
entry of orders halting the overcharging at issue and finding
damages.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

LEO A. WALKER,
Plaintiff
vs.
BRIGHAM CITY, PETER C.
KNUDSON, BETH W. GURRISTER,
DAVID G. HACKING, DEE J.
HAMMON, ROBERT B. SHELTON, and
MARK A. WALKER, REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY NO. 1 OF BRIGHAM CITY,
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 2 OF
BRIGHAM CITY: MICHAEL T.
COSGROVE, and JOHN OR JANE
DOES I THROUGH X,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO, 870030069

Defendants

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The Plaintiff

bases his claim partially on the allegation

that the action by the city of charging rates / which he argues
are

unreasonably

unconstitutional

high,
taking.

Defendant's Memorandum

is

amoving

For

reasons

other
set

things

forth

in

an
the

and Reply Memorandum this Court agrees

that the issue here does not necessarily rise to the level of
constitutional magnitude.
The city does not argue that the Plaintiff

may challenge

the rate making process, or more specifically the rate levels,
and agrees that this Court has the power
making

process

to determine

to review the rate

if it is free from arbitrary and

capricious exercise of power and that rates are reasonable for
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the service provided.
The two approaches are directly related.

The Court has the

power to review either the rates or the rate setting procedure
where

the

arbitrary

rates are so unreasonable
and capricious action.

as to be

the

result ^of

Caution obviously has to be

exercised in order not to intrude in an unwarranted fashion on
the legislative function, nor to make the Court a rate making
body.
This Court observed at the hearing, that if the legislature
wanted

to

excess

of those necessary

readily
rates
the

limit the municipality's

have done so.

charged

power

to

charge

rates

in

to cover the costs, etc., it could

The Legislature did

provide

that

the

are to be sufficient to provide for payment of

interest

and

administration

principle,

and

to

operation,

reserve, impropriety, etc.

create

funds,

maintenance,

pay

for

depreciation

It neither specifically allowed or

precluded profit - over and above that necessary for the above
mentioned purposes.
It

is

envisioned

apparent
the

from

the

municipality

language

charging

that

enough

the
to

Legislature
provide

the

service in order that the service be not 'dependent-on taxes-or
other revenues to support the same.

What the statute however

does not say is that, "such rates shall only be sufficient to
provide such payments, etc.".

Had it done so, the Plaintiff's

argument would be easier to approach.
Moreover,
municipality

both
may,

parties

though

not

appear

to

specifically

agree

that

authorized

by

the
the

statute or prohibited therefrom, charge enough for a reasonable
profit to be realized.

The statute neither mentions nor
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defines

"reasonable

"reasonable

rates",

service rendered".
Summary

profit",

but

specifically/

does

mention

"reasonable

rather

rate

for

The issue then before us on this Motion for
is whether there are facts in, dispute as

Judgment

the
to

the allegation that Brigham City officials acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in setting the rates for utility services and or
are the rates unreasonably high.
Defendant

would

separate

the actual consideration

rates from the rate setting process.
that that can be done.

of the

This Court is not so sure

If the rates are unreasonably high then

it may follow the process or acts of the Brigham City officials
would therefore have to be likewise unreasonable/ arbitrary or
capricious.

The task of the Court it seems then, is first to

define

"reasonable

apply/

then

rates" by

examine

the

finding

rates

the

charged

legal
to

standards to

determine

their

reasonableness.
The

parties

transcripts
Brigham

City

introduced

of depositions
are

related

affidavits

stating

and

portions

of

that the rates charged by

to those charged

by

investor

owned

utilities and utilities owned and operated by municipalities of
a similar size.
things,

the

Plaintiffs Affidavit states that, among other

rates charged

are higher

than needed for payment

and maintenance as provided by the statute and that the excess
funds are transferred to a general fund used for other public
purposes.
Though
appropriate

the
forum

Defendants
in

which

argue
to

that

question

this
the

is

not

wisdom

of

the
the

legislative discretion on the part of the Brigham City council/
the Defendant does admit that if in fact the Brigham City
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council acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in -establishing these
rates or if the rates are unreasonably high then review by this
review is proper.
No

allegations

are made or supported

for

the purpose

of

this Motion that the city's procedure of establishing the rates
is

improper,

provisions

or

that

it

failed

municipal

to

comply

ordinance

in

with

the

establishing

statutorythe

rates

except that the rates are higher than needed to provide for the
cost

of production

as envisioned by the statute and that the

rates were established with the intent of producing a surplus
to be transferred

to the general

with which the city undertook
above

stated/

to

is not challenged.

the Plaintiff that historically
the

statutory

requirements,

fund.
set

The actual procedure
the

rates, other

than

(There was some argument by

the city did not comply with

but

since

this

action

is

for

injunctive relief that issue is not particularly material for
this Motion for Summary Judgment.)
The Defendant has argued that reasonableness is a matter of
fact

and

issued

this

on

determine
in

stated

August

11,

whether

the

unreasonable.
that

Court

the

earlier

1988,
rates

that
being

For cited authorities
Ventura

case

in a Memorandum
facts

are

Decision

necessary

charged - are excessive

to
or

the Plaintiff has argued

(Hansen

vs.

the

City

of

San-Buenaventura, 729 P.2d 186 California 1986) involved only a
3% return on the rates wherein this case there is a 30% rate of
return.

Defendant has cited Triangle Oil. Inc. vs. North Salt

Lake Corporation, 609 P.2d 1338 (1980) for the principle that
the Court should exercise its powers of review only if it is
shown that the exercise of municipal power is* M^so wholly
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discordant
deemed

to

reason

capricious

and

and

justice

arbitrary

that

its

and thus

actions

must

be

in violation of the

complainant's rights".
The problem lies in discussing
to rates for services rendered.

rates of return as opposed

The statute does not preclude

any certain- rate of return or profit, what it does require is a
reasonable rate for the service rendered.

The question then is

not one of percentage of profit; i.e., rate of return but rate
charged
the

for the value of the service

Court

suggested

in

the

rendered.

August

11,

That

1988,

is what

Memorandum

Decision, that fees may not be in excess of the value of the
service

provided.

The city is not precluded bv that statute

from obtaining a certain rate of return, even a high

rate of

return or profit, but it is precluded from charging a rate not
reasonable for than the value of the service rendered.
likely

so

because

service.
value

the

city

is

If the city charged

of

the

service

the

only

provider

rates greatly

rendered,

and

This is

since

of

that

in excess of the
it

is

the

only

provider in Brigham City by state law, then that rate would be
unreasonable and violative of the statute.
Contrary then to the Plaintiff's argument it would
that

the

must

take

services
require

determination
into

of the value of the

comparison

provided

the

rates

to other consumers.

an analysis

and by other non-municipal

producing

the

bench

mark

power

against

charged

by

each

which

the

*for

by

other

providers.

individual
rate

rendered
similar

That would necessarily

of the rates charged

providers

service

appear

The cost of

provider

charged

is

municipal

is not

the

compared,

but

rather it is the value of the product provided or service
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rendered.
Value
willing

is

to

generally

pay.

determined

by

what

Economics dictate that

the ^consumer

the higher

is

the rate

charged perhaps the less the consumer is willing to buy and the
lower

the

rate

the consumer

is willing to

buy.

However, because the Plaintiff and other

individuals in

his position

charged

the more

are a "captive consumer" it seems to this Court

that the amount other consumers are paying here and elsewhere
is a better

criteria

for determining

reasonableness

than the

costs of production as the best analysis of the value of the
service

rendered.

statute

The

term

should be defined

the city then is not

"reasonable"/

by comparison.

restricted

as

used

Stated

in

the

another way

to a cost basis analysis to

determine its reasonable rates, but the reasonable rates are to
be determined by the value of the service rendered.

The only

way to reasonably determine the value of that service rendered
is to compare like services and rates.
If the city were selling its power for substantially higher
rates than like services provided by other providers or if the
city were selling its power for rates considerably lower than
sufficient to provide for maintenance of the costs as required
by statute then the Plaintiffs
But

the

uncontested

fact

that

argument would be well taken.
the

city

is

charging

rates

reasonably comparable to those charged by other providers, even
though higher than they need to in order to cover costs, does
not demonstrate that the rates are unreasonably
the

city

power.

acted

unreasonably

in

exercise

of

high or that

its

legislative

If the city government wants to charge less than what

it is charging now, but still sufficient to cover the costs, it
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may do so under the statute but that is a legislative .function rrsca
to be controlled by the City Council and is an area~ in .which tne
the Court should not intervene. Defendant's Motion for Summary -r^s*
Judgment is therefore granted. Counsel for the Defendant is
directed to prepare a formal Order in conformance herewith.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid to the.following;J-J j.
Robert R. Wallace, Attorney at Law, 4 Triad Center STE 500, P.Ch..Box
2970, Salt Lake City, UT 84110, Jody K. Burnett.and Craig L. - ^z
Barlow, Attorneys at Law, 10 Exchange Place, 11th Fir •, .P.O. „ box:,.
45000, Salt Lake City, UT 841110, Merrill G. Hansen and James I.
Watts, Attorneys at Law, 1245 Brickyard Road Dr., STE 600, Salt Lake
City, UT 84106 and Ben Hadfield and Jeff R. Thorne, Attorneys at
Law, P.O. Box F, Brigham City, UT 84302.
DATED this 2nd day of April, 1991.

/S/MARLALILJENQUIST
Maria Liljenquist
Deputy Clerk
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JODY K BURNETT
CRAIG L. BARLOW
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LEO A. WALKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

BRIGHAM CITY, PETER C. KNUDSON,
BETH W. GURRISTER, DAVID G.
HACKING, DEE J. HAMMON, ROBERT
B. SHELTON, and MARK A WALKER
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 1 of
BRIGHAM CITY, REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY NO. 2 of BRIGHAM CITY;
MICHAEL T. COSGROVE, and JOHN
or JANE DOES I through X,

Civil No. 870030069

Defendants.

On March 21, 1989 the parties, through counsel, appeared
before the Court for argument on several motions, including
plaintiff's and defendants' Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment.

The plaintiff was represented by Robert R. Wallace

and defendants were represented by Jeff T h o m e , Merrill Hansen
and Craig L. Barlow.

The parties had submitted Memoranda in

support of their motions and opposing the motions*

On

August 11, 1988 this Court issued a Memorandum Decision
on both Motions for Partial Summary Judgment • The plaintiff
had not submitted a memorandum in response to the defendants1
motion at the time the Memorandum Decision was issued despite
the fact that counsel for defendants had agreed that the
plaintiff could have additional time to file a responsive
memorandum.

The Court allowed the plaintiff to submit a

reply memorandum and has now reviewed all of the memoranda
submitted as well as the Court's file of the entire matter
and considered the argument of counsel.

Based on the Court's

review and analysis its Memorandum Decision of August 11, 1988
granting defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
claims 1 through 6 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint remains
the Court's decision in this case.

The Court also grants the

defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Leo Walker
submitted in support of plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The Court finds

there are no disputes of materj^i-JLasufiLS ftf fact and the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on claims 1 through
6 of the plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
hereby
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Therefore, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t defendants' Motion
for P a r t i a l Summary Judgment i s granted, with prejudice
and p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Summary Judgment i s denied,
p a r t i e s t o bear t h e i r own c o s t s .
DATED t h i s

j,?^ day of

[V)^\

, 1989.

FIRST DISTRICT COURT

By
Judge Gordon Low

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

By ^ z C ^ v 5 ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^
Robert R. Wallace
Counsel for Plaintiff
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PERSON a
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

LEO WALKER

,

r>

££32* WK«SS«

Plaintiff,
|

MEMORANDUM DECISION

VS.

]|

FILE NO.

BRIGHAM CITY ET AL

]

Defendants.

870030069

]

In this matter Leo Walker has filed a motion for
Summary Judgment, seeking therein a Declaratory Judgment, that
the electrical utility fees charged by Brigham City,
Corporation to its customers are excessive and
unconstitutional and for an injunction enjoining Brigham City
Corporation from collection of excess fees for utility
services, an injunction preventing Brigham City from
collecting the purposed $2.00 per month additional fee for an
electrical service and for attorney fees;
The relationship between the action for Summary
Judgment and the specific causes of action in the complaint is
unclear. The Plaintiff alleges the grounds for the motion are
that the charges made by Brigham City for Utility Services are
excessive and constitute a taking of Plaintiff's property
without constitutional due process, therefore in violation of
both Federal and State Constitutions and the excessive charges
are violative of the Utah Code annotated. Section 55-3-3.
There appears to be no dispute that between the years
1983 and 1987, the Defendant, Brigham City collected funds in
charges for utility services and transferred certain of tnose
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funds into the City's general fund. The funds collected were
in excess of the sums of moneys required to operate the
electrical services provided by the city. Further allegations
are that during 1988 the City will transfer $1,275,858.00 from
the Utility Funds to the General Fund, that those-funds
represent monies in excess of expenses relating to the
providing of electrical utility services. In addition thereto
the City is proposing a $2.00 per month electrical hook-up fee
for all persons using utilities during 1988-89. Neither of
the cases cited under section 1 of the Plaintifffs brief are
directly on point but are argued to be applicable by inference
or by implication.
It appears to the Court that one focal point of this
issue is^ what is meant under Section 55-3-10 of the Utah Code
annotated where in the City is authorized to charge rates for
services provided but not in excess of those "reasonable for
service rendered". Plaintiff argues that because the City
charges more for its electrical service th^n it needed to meet
the expense of providing this the service, it is therefore in
excess of a "reasonable rate for the service rendered". No
evidence or facts are supplied relative to what is a
"reasonable rate for the service rendered". In other words
though the City may be charging more for ^the^service thari"it
costs the City to provide the same, that may not be
dispositive of the question of whether the charge is in excess
of "reasonable rate for service" rendered".
The Court is left unaware of the facts as to whether
the Plaintiff is receiving his moneys worth or if the rate is
"reasonable for the service" he is provided or even how and if
that could be calculated. But it seems overly simplistic to
conclude that since the City receives more than it expends
related to electrical service that therefore its rate is "in
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excess of a reasonable rate for the service rendered". It
seems to the Court that far more information and facts are
needed before Summary Judgment can be granted on that issue.
The Defendant further argues since that this -is not a class
action, Plaintiff must therefore be able to show that the
service charges he pays individually are unreasonable. Again
those are further facts which are not supplied and are of
which the Court is unaware at this juncture. Whether the
Plaintiff's claim is cognizable under the Federal Statute
cited in the complaint cannot at this time be determined.
The Plaintiff's second point essentially is that the
charging by the City of excessive fees not reasonably related
to the services being provided is a taking of property in
violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The threshold
problem in this section of the Plaintiff's argument is the
same as the first, that is this Court is without sufficient
facts to determine whether the fees being charged are
excessive fees, unreasonably related to the service provided.
The fees obviously are in excess of the cost of
providing the service but they may not 'be in excess of the
value of the service received. Further facts"lmust Tbe provided
the Court on that issue. The Court distinguishes the case of
Weber Basin Hombuilder Association vs. Roy City as there was
apparently no showing by Roy City, that it had experienced a
commensurate increase in the cost of running the building
department, therefore justifying the increase from $10.00 to
$112.00 in building permits.The builder was receiving no real
benefit from the issuance of the building permit and therefore
it was easily determined that the increase to $112*00 was not~
reasonably related to the service provided. In this case
however the Plaintiff is apparently receiving electrical
service and the question is whether or not what he pays for it-
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is "reasonably related to the service provided". The
defendant further argues in response to point 2, that the
exact nature of the property right which the Plaintiff
alleges that he is being denied must at the on-set be
determined and that the Plaintiff has failed to identify the
same.
Obviously if the Plaintiff refused to pay what he
considers to be an excessive rate, that the utility service
will be discontinuted, therefore depriving him of a property
right which can only be done so legally if in fact the charges
are not excessive; otherwise the termination may be illegal
and an unconstitutional taking. Before we. get to that issue,
the question of excess charges and the questions of the
charges and their reasonableness and the relationship to the
service rendered must be determined.
The Plaintiff's request therefore under point 2, for
Summary Judgment is denied and the claim under point 3, for
Attorney Fees is premature and therefore also denied.
The Defendants have moved this Court to strike the
affidavit of the Plaintiff. Where the motions are denied,
there is no need to rule on motion to strike.
The Defendants have filed motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on several portions of the complaint.
With respect to all claims against individual
defendants, they relate entirely to legislative functions,
even setting the budget, determining rates and expenses
allocable to the operation of the electrical and sewer
facilities in State, are legislative in nature and are
protected by an unbrella of immunity.
The first six claims of the plaintifffs complaint ar
Federal Civil Rights Claims. Remaining issues are brought
under State law with respect to claim 1, of the plaintiffs
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complaint, the same alleges that the City is involved in a
Civil Rights violation against defendant by taking property
without just compensation, violative of the fifth amendment of
the United States Consititution. This Court specifically
finds that that allegation does not state a Federal Civil
Rights claim. In the denial of the Plaintiff's Summary
Judgment, this Court pointed out that the Plaintiff has not
shown that the rates charged are unreasonable, as
reasonableness must be determined on more factors than just an
expense/rate basis. It further assumed that the action is
being brought under the Civil Rights Acts, section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act. But even if the allegation were true, that
does not constitute a valid claim under that act. Rather the
nature of alleged protected property interest of which the
Plaintiff is being deprived is not articulated, though the
defendant argues that the Plaintiff's relationship to the City
is contractual and therefore it does not fall within the ambit
of Constitutional protection. The Court does not necessarily
agree that that is dispositive of the question as the services
are far more than a contractual relationship. The City is the
only agencey able to provide such services. However if
Plaintiff's complaint is based on the breach of the'implied"
contract, through excessive charges, that does constitute a
Federal Claim.
The Court fully agrees with the defendant however in
that in this case, the Court a/ should Restrain itself from
interferring with the exercise with legislative functions of
the City, unless the City is out-side of its authority, its
actions capricious, arbitrary, and or in violation of
Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights.
With respect to claim two of the Plaintiff's complaint
the Plaintiff has failed to show how it is he is being
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discriminated against and therefore being deprived of equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the United States and the
Utah Constitution. Plaintiff here allege that the City has
been involved in a violation of Plaintiff's procedural and
substantret in due process rights. In suppoirtrof the same the
plaintiff has not shown that he has been deprived of other
remedys available.
The claim under 1983 Civil Right Act cannot be
substantiated by showing that the defendant has violated the
State Statutes or State Constitutional law. The Plaintiff has
argued that the Defendant has acted in violation of Utah Code
Annotated above cited, but liability under the 1983 Civil
Rights rests upon violations of the United States Constitution.
Plaintifffs claim 4, relative to denial of equal
protection, ~is unsupported by any claim of discrimination or
against a class to which the Plaintiff belongs. In fact no
class to which he belongs is identified. Whether the law
requires a showing of a purposeful discrimination or a
specific intent on the behalf of the defendant, at this point
is irrevelant. The Plaintiff has failed to show a denial of
equal protection.
Under claim five and six of the Plaintifffs complaint
the Court fails to see where the Plaintiff has pled a
violation of a constitutional law, or an application of the
Federal or Constitutional Standards. Further more it seems
clear the claims made in one through six may be articulated
and sought through other remedial processes i.e. adequate
State remedies to redress a property damage claim may exist.
It seem there can be no deprivation of due process of law
since the due process has not been accessed. Another avenue
aside from the seeking of a 1983 Civil Rights Claim have nor
been

7-

exhausted but here the Plaintiff has failed ±o show a
deprivation of a Federal Constitutional protected civil Right*
The reasons above stated the defendants motion* for
Summary Judgment with respect from claims one through six and
all claims against individual defendants shall be dismissed
and the Summary Judgment granted.
Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare a
formal order.
Dated this //d
day of August, 1988.
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